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Ukraine needs comprehensive
public debt policy
Conditions for the recovery of the public borrowing market are economic growth,
financial stability, and consistent government policies. In order not to repeat
previous mistakes, the government should borrow within the framework of a
longterm public debt strategy. The International Center for Policy Studies
presents its view of the public debt policy in Ukraine in special chapter of the
Quarterly Predictions journal. In our opinion, the government needs to
accomplish the following tasks: formulate its policy regarding debt, set up a
system of debt management, and develop the domestic capital market
Political and economic changes have
raised the importance of developing a
public debt strategy for Ukraine. We
consider the following changes as the
most important:
• Higher quality of budget policy. Firstly,
a balanced budget confirms the
government's intention to stop releasing
uncontrolled loans. Secondly, the
Finance Ministry has developed
procedures for programmed and targeted
budget expenditures that would ensure
targeted use of the budget allocations
and allow determining priority
investment programs. Thirdly, medium&
term budget planning will help keep
track of government needs for financing.
• A closer focus of the monetary policy
on lowering inflation and maintaining a
stable exchange rate. To achieve these
targets, the NBU needs a developed
secondary government securities market,
since in this case the bank would
receive additional monetary policy
instruments.
• Economic growth, financial stability,
and consistent government policy.
Under these conditions, commercial
banks can free up resources and,
therefore, can use government securities
as an investment alternative. Moreover,
under such conditions the government
securities might become attractive for
foreign investors.
Goals of public debt policy
The first step in the development of a
public debt policy for Ukraine is to
formulate the policy goals. In our
opinion, this policy should aim to
improve social welfare by making a
choice between the current and future
government consumption:
• Changing the public debt allows
maintaining the level of government
expenditures in periods of cyclical
recession.
• Government borrowings can be used as
investments that would affect the
welfare of different generations. Thus,
future generations will both enjoy the
fruits of the investments and have to
repay the debts.
• A broader and deeper market of
government securities would represent
(1) an additional source of revenues for
the private sector's free funds, (2) a
market instrument of monetary policy,
and (3) an indication of the domestic
investment climate.
In our opinion, the Ukrainian
government faces the following tasks:
(1) develop and justify the public debt
strategy; (2) create a debt management
system; and (3) develop the domestic
government securities market.
Policymaking
The government should issue and
publicise a document that would analyse
existing problems and justify the main
long&term targets of debt policy. This
document is an important condition for
government credibility in the eyes of
investors, since it would assure the
transparency and predictability of
government behaviour with respect to
the state debt. Moreover, a consistent
public debt strategy would favour the
approval of corresponding laws in the
Ukrainian parliament.
Public debt management
The main goal of debt management is to
meet the government's needs for
financing and to repay its debts at a
minimal cost in the medium and long
run. In a broader sense, the goal is to
ensure a stable dynamic and level of the
public debt, for only in this case would
the government be able to guarantee
steady repayments under any economic
conditions.
The debt management system can
become effective only if the objectives
and functions of the budget, monetary,
and debt management policies are
clearly determined.
In Ukraine, functions and
responsibilities in the area of debt
management have already been
established de facto. The Finance
Ministry develops debt policy, submits
proposals on debt emissions to the
Cabinet of Ministers, and issues orders
on public debt repayment and servicing
to the State Treasury. To this end, a
public debt department has been
established in the Finance Ministry,
with its units being responsible for
domestic and foreign debt
management. Meanwhile, the NBU
provides for the technical functioning
of the government securities market,
and the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine
serves as an external controlling body.
The clear functions of this triangle,
however, have not yet been legally
determined. In our opinion, the
distribution of responsibilities between
the Finance Ministry and the State
Treasury, as well as the independence of
monetary policy from debt management
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requirements will provoke the hottest
debates.
Currently, the functions of debt
policymaking and debt management are
fulfilled by the public debt department
of the Finance Ministry.  This
concentration of responsibilities allowed
putting the public debt system in order.
In the long run, the Finance Ministry will
need to deal with more complicated
tasks. These include the evaluation of
investment programs which require
external financing. On the other hand,
once the system of debt management is
established, further adjustments will be
sooner technical than conceptual in
nature. The more active the state
borrowing policy, the more time workers
of the Finance Ministry will need to
allocate to technical issues, being forced
to divert from the analysis of government
needs for financing, i.e., accumulating
new debts.
International experience proves that the
most efficient systems are where the
function of debt policymaking is granted
to the Finance Ministry and the
management of risks and expenditures, as
well as the issue of debt and
reimbursement of principal and interest
payments, is fulfilled by the Treasury. The
effective legislation of Ukraine envisions
this same distribution of functions.
We see the following advantages in the
distribution of policymaking and
management functions between the
Finance Ministry and State Treasury with
respect to the public debt:
• The Finance Ministry focuses on
determining and analysing priority
programs: loans attracted to finance
them would allow maximising the
welfare of future generations.
• The State Treasury would manage both
the monetary and debt flows of the
government. With these powers, the
Treasury will be fully responsible for
government liquidity. It will manage all
government assets and liabilities and will
choose optimal borrowing strategies,
based on the analysis of government
assets. Combining these functions would
require amending Ukrainian laws (this
primarily concerns the right of the State
Treasury to sell surplus funds in the inter&
bank market) and developing the
agency's capacity to fulfil these tasks.
The main criterion for determining the
NBU's role in debt policy is independent
monetary policy. The independence
would remove inconsistencies between
the targets of the monetary and debt
management policies. One in particular
is interest rates: lower rates would make
the debt cheaper, while the central
bank, willing to abate inflationary
pressures, might find raising interest
rates more expedient.
International experience proves that the
government and the central bank should
cooperate to prevent simultaneous
moves in the same segments of the
capital market. The coordination task
becomes more complicated if the capital
market is underdeveloped. If the moves
are not coordinated, neither party is able
to achieve its goals.
Development of the domestic
capital market
An efficiently operating, liquid market
of the domestic government debt would
be beneficial for all potential agents of
this market. For private investors,
government securities (GS) are a source
of risk&free revenue. A liquid GS market
would ensure that monetary policy is
independent of government needs for
financing, because the NBU would no
longer be the biggest lender to the
government. Thanks to operations in
the secondary GS market, the NBU would
have more instruments with which to
affect money supply. Finally, for the
government, a developed GS market is a
source of relatively cheap (thanks to its
liquidity) loans.
Private investors will evince a demand
for GS only under conditions of
macroeconomic stability. Today, the
balanced budget and stable exchange
rate provide these conditions. The
balanced budget signals the
government's willingness to repay its
debt. Meantime, facing a stable
exchange rate, commercial banks have
fewer profit opportunities in the FX
market. However, high inflationary
expectations leave little hope for a rapid
recovery of demand for GS on the part of
commercial banks. The return on
medium&term GS is set equal to the
targeted inflation rate, which the
government has failed to accomplish in
the past. As a result, the demand for
short&term GS is higher than for medium&
term ones.
A more liquid GS market would remove
the effect of this factor, since banks
would be able to sell their GS holdings.
In our opinion, the liquidity of the
market will depend on the market
infrastructure, the availability of a
variety of GS, and the number of
investors. The Finance Ministry is
undertaking the following steps to raise
the liquidity of the GS market:
• A primary dealer's institution. The
Finance Ministry and commercial banks
have been preparing a relevant
normative act, according to which only
primary dealers who bid to buy no less
than 2% of the GS emission will be able
to participate in the GS sales auctions.
Overall, primary dealers are to be the
market makers, ensuring market liquidity
by placing sales and purchase orders.
• Gradual introduction of GS with a
longer term to maturity. Along with the
traditional zero&coupon 4& and 7&month
bills, the NBU floated coupon
government bills from its portfolio. In
addition, the Finance Ministry regularly
offers 18&month bonds to market agents.
• Debt issues for individuals. In this
way, the Finance Ministry aims to make
the market broader.
• Transparency of domestic borrowing.
For the first time, the ministry started
collaborating with commercial banks,
willing to establish partner relations
with some of them. The ministry plans
to place GS prices and auction results
on its web site.
Both the Finance Ministry and the NBU
consider the development of the GS
market to be beneficial. This enhances
the effectiveness of collaboration
between the two institutions, especially
after the government debt restructuring
before the NBU in September 2000. A
first, most fruitful result has been the
removal of the reserve requirement
imposed by the NBU on commercial
banks' holdings of GS. Thanks to the
REPO operations with the NBU's
holdings of the restructured GS, the
market started heating up. Yet,
procedures of harmonising the tactic
steps of the government and the NBU
are not consistent or transparent. With
the lack of transparency, any small
inconsistency negatively affects market
credibility in the eyes of the commercial
banks. !
